Abstract

This article discusses the issue of spreading out a performance under Art. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure which as a procedural provision directly interferes in the substantive law regulations. In order to reconstruct the precise legal character of Art. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at the beginning the notion of deferment and its relationship to the norms specified in the provisions of the substantive law have been discussed. When analysing the article it should be noted that the norm contained therein directly affects judicial moratorium.

At the same time, when discussing the amount of claim which should be adjudged in case the performance has been spread out into instalments, not only the case law adopted in judicature should be taken into consideration, but also the views presented in literature. The Supreme Court’s position is that all interest should be adjudged with the exception of interest for the time from the date of the ruling to the date of payment of individual instalments. On the other hand, the doctrine presents different views concerning the consequence of delay, which allows to distinguish three fundamental doctrinal currents.

As a result of the analysis it may be stated that if a performance is spread out into instalments, under Art. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court should adjudge total claim including interest for the time from the date of the ruling to the date of payment of individual instalments. Moreover, having in mind the present legal regulation, it should be noted that it is not sufficient to consider the doubts arising from Art. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but further de lege ferenda proposals should be presented.