Abstract

The article presents how the concept of „offence” used in Art. 442¹ § 2 of the Civil Code has been autonomised and detached from the conceptual framework of criminal law in Supreme Court judgements. It outlines the history of the regulation concerning the time for prescription of claims for the repair of damage caused by ab an illicit act which at the same time constitutes an offence, as well as the reasons underlying the departure from linguistic interpretation of the regulations in favour of functional interpretation. It was considered appropriate for the broad understanding of the notion of „offence” not to be associated with a negative assessment of the act or the perpetrator. In conclusion, a proposal has been put forward to understand the offence provided for in Art. 442¹ § 2 of the Civil Code as an offence substantively tantamount to a crime or a misdemeanour the perpetrator of which has objectively violated the rules of of the regular procedure.