Abstract

Interest for delay in payment plays different functions in civil law transactions; in particular, it stimulate the debtor to make payment on time or make up for the creditor’s loss as a result of not being able to use the funds. The general rules for adjudicating interest for delay are laid down in Art. 481–482 of the Civil Code and those provisions are interpreted in conjunction with Art. 455 of the Civil Code. However, adjudication of interest for delay on claims for damages shows significant differences. Pursuant to the dominant case law position interest for delay is due only as of the date of passing the verdict by the court. The source of differences are the rules for determination of the amount of damages laid down in Art. 362 § 2 of the Civil Code. This provision not only modifies the principles for adjudicating interest, but also affects its legal profile thus provoking greater tension between individual functions of interest for delay. It seems, however, that there are no constructional indications against adjudicating interest for default according to a different date than the date being a basis for determination of damages as provided for in Art. 363 § 2 of the Civil Code. The functional argument is of key significance here, i.e. the prohibition of enrichment of the victim as a result of the damage inflicted on them. However, the force of its action is connected with a given profile of social and economic relations effective at the time when the dominant adjudicative line is shaped.