Abstract

The study attempted to establish the characteristics of collusive tendering in construction contracts in Poland. In particular, it focused on determining the susceptibility of construction contracts to the occurrence of collusive tendering, identifying collusion strategies used by contractors in this market in Poland and determining whether the evidence used in proceedings by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection can be used to prevent collusion at the stage of the procurement procedure.

The study was conducted based on the results of proceedings conducted by the national competition authority – the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection – and a survey of local government units.

Analysis of the competition authority’s decision–making practice revealed 12 collusive tenders in construction contracts since 2004. The collusive arrangements affected 82 procurement procedures, and the cartelists’ dominant strategy was to withdraw and rotate bids. Almost all identified collusion participants were connected by family or business relationships. Cartelists could effectively manipulate the results of procurement procedures by taking relatively simple actions. The rationale for collusive bidding used in the competition authority’s practice provides valuable tools for contracting authorities in combating collusive bidding. The limited number of examples of collusion implemented according to strategies used in concentrated markets justifies extending future research with data from a broader range of sources.