Monitor Prawa Handlowego

no. 1/2012

Acting to the detriment of a bank as fraud -- a critical gloss

Robert Zawłocki
Autor jest Kierownikiem Katedry Prawa Karnego WPiA w Poznaniu, specjalistą z zakresu prawa karnego gospodarczego, autorem ponad 100_publikacji naukowych.
Abstract

In its ruling of 13 January 2010 in case no. II KK 150/09, the Supreme Court found the petition for cassation filed by the convicted party’s attorney to be legitimate to the extent in which the charge of infringement of the substantive criminal law, i.e. Art. 286 § 1 Of the Penal Code, was raised, with a view to the finding by the court of general jurisdiction that the act with which the convicted party had been charged exhausted the attributes of fraud described in that provision. In that case, the District court (court of first instance) adopted certain qualification, which was then fully corroborated by the Regional Court (court of second instance). This article presents the ruling of the court of general jurisdiction within the meaning of the final judgment, i.e. passed by the court of second instance, although applied (differently than in the contents of the indictment) by the court of first instance.

Thus, the Supreme Court assumed a strictly defined position as to the practically and theoretically important problem of acting to the bank’s detriment by fraud, consisting in bank’s customer using the pay card received from the bank without having sufficient funds in his account.