Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 25 February 2025, delivered in Joined Cases C-146/23 and C-374/23, concerning the permissible scope of influence exercised by the legislative and executive authorities of the Member States over judicial remuneration. In that judgment, the Court, interpreting Article 19(1), second subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, elaborates on the principle of judicial independence, as well as on the criteria that the national mechanisms for determining judges’ remuneration must satisfy, including the requirements of legality, objectivity, predictability, stability and transparency. Special attention is also devoted to the permissibility of introducing derogations from the applicable national regulations, such as limiting salary increases, freezing or reducing judicial remuneration, and to the conditions under which such measures may be regarded as compatible with EU law.
The Court emphasized that the vital importance regarding the assessment of the conformity of national measures with the EU standard for the protection of the judiciary depends, in particular, on the prohibition of arbitrary action by the political authorities, the existence of effective judicial review, and compliance with the principles of proportionality and the exceptional nature of measures affecting the material situation of judges.