Monitor Prawniczy
no. 9/2016
The capacity of an ordinary association to be a party in civil proceedings
Adiunkt i wykładowczyni Szkoły Wyższej im. Pawła Włodkowica w Płocku. Autorka brała
aktywny udział, jako ekspertka od spraw stowarzyszeniowych, w pracach legislacyjnych nad zmianą
ustawy – Prawo o stowarzyszeniach, prowadzonych przez Kancelarię Prezydenta RP, oraz w pracach
podkomisji i komisji sejmowych nad nowelizacją Prawa o stowarzyszeniach.
Abstract
The glossed Supreme Court decision of 16 April 2015 (I CSK 396/14) boils down to accepting a thesis that an ordinary association is not capable of being a party in civil proceedings. The analysis of this decision from the viewpoint of interpretation of the law applied by the bench allows for formulating a critical evaluation of the reasoning followed by the Supreme Court. It leads to a conclusion which ultimately deprives an ordinary association (which by the glossed Supreme Court decision is denied the standing of a legal entity without corporate status within the meaning of Art. 331 § 1 of the Civil Code) of legal capacity, capacity to be a party in court proceedings, and the status of a non-governmental organization. The analysis of the notions (legal capacity”, “capacity to be a party in court proceedings” and “non-governmental organization” carried out by the Supreme Court implies unfavourable consequences for the simplified form of an association. It creates in this respect such a legal situation which deprives an ordinary association of some autonomy, which is against not only the rule of law, but also against the sense of social justice. That is why, apart from various practical implications, this issues is also interesting from the theoretical viewpoint.