Abstract

Currently, courts often do not apply the same fictitious practice of effective delivery in relation to entities registered in the Central Register and Information on Business Activities (CEIDG) as they do in relation to entities entered in the National Court Register (KRS) - rigor fiction. Thus, the public CEIDG register is depreciated and the contact data it contains frequently fail to improve the Civil Procedure as they should. This leads to situations where the same regulation which equally treats an entrepreneur entered in the CEIDG and the operator entered in the KRS is interpreted by the courts in a completely different manner - even to the effect of refusing “normative content” with respect to the former. This is mainly due to unequal treatment of both groups as regards forewarning about the consequences of failing to provide accurate and current contact data in the register. The doctrine points out the need for changes, mainly towards complete unification of the regulations relating to these groups of entities as regards service of judicial documents. So far the courts either treat the entrepreneurs entered in the CEIDG as other natural persons, or (less frequently) make delivery to the address disclosed in the CEIDG as the address for service. Alas, frequent identification of the place of residence and address stipulated in Art. 126 § 2.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (and a similar a similar practice applied when interpreting Art. 139 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure) and assumption that the first delivery should be always to the address of the place of residence of a natural person (including those who are also entrepreneurs) cause that in fact the instruction Art. 139 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be applied towards entrepreneurs entered in the CEIDG. The plaintiff cannot be sure whether in a situation whereby only the contact data disclosed in the CEIDG (including the defendant’s address for deliveries) are available the case could be given the status of lis pendens.