Monitor Prawniczy
no. 4/2016
The object of guarantee and the nature of the obligational relationship
Autorka jest adiunktem w Zakładzie Prawa Cywilnego i Prawa
Międzynarodowego Prywatnego na WPAiE Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
Abstract
This article has been inspired by the Supreme Court judgment of 9.10.2014 (IV CSK 29/14). It assumed that it was unacceptable to conclude a guarantee agreement whose guaranteed result would be the behaviour of a third party not consisting in the assumption of an obligation or provision of a performance. I believe that the thesis of that judgment, although going against the predominant position in Polish literature, is correct. It seems that the ulterior purpose of such guarantee agreements is to influence third parties so they behave in a way expected by the guarantee beneficiary, and yet such behaviours are not the subject of any legal obligations for those parties. For these reasons I believe that this type of guarantee agreements should be regarded as against the limit of the freedom of contract, namely the nature of the obligational relationship, as it may not be used in order of exert influence, even if only indirectly, on third parties.