Abstract

Internet has become an indispensable everyday life element for billions of people. Subsequent countries amend their legislations recognizing Internet access to be an element of the elementary social package to be guaranteed by the state to its citizens.

From the very beginning of its existence Internet was considered to be a medium which will allow millions of people freely communicate with the world, a specific embodiment of the idea of the freedom of expression and the freedom of speech. The medium which is also accessible without any technological, geographical or financial barriers which are typical of the press, radio or television.

In this context, the major task of the EU legislator in the course of work on regulations with respect to “the right to be forgotten” was to find the golden mean between protection of privacy of Internet users and the freedom of speech and the right to free formulation and expression of opinions or the freedom of artistic creation.

Looking back its seems that thanks to a quite unexpected decision of the CJEU in case C-131/12 the task of the EU legislator has been made easier. Both the C-131/12 judgment itself, as well as the ensuing discussion (including the Working Group Guidelines, doctrine of law statements, numerous judgments of national courts in Member States) provided a lot of information on potential threats accompanying exercise of “the right to be forgotten” and its impact on the freedom of expression and the freedom of speech.

The present shape of the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation introducing “the right to be forgotten” makes it possible to presume that their application will, however, favour defenders of the right to privacy of Internet users at the expense of weakening the position of defenders of the right to the freedom of speech and the freedom of expression.