Abstract

The article looks at the current institutional model of the President of the Public Procurement Office (PPO) and concludes that it is burdened with several structural deficiencies.
First, there is a manifest disproportionality between the scale of the public procurement market and the actual scope of impact of the supervisory authority. This serves to marginalise its oversight functions. Second, the absence of enforcement instruments leaves the recommendations and opinions of the President of the PPO devoid of legally binding force and generates no obligations on their addressees. Third, the institutional weakness of the office is reflected in the lack of fixed-term tenure, the absence of legislative powers in the form of legislative initiative, and full dependence on the minister responsible for economic affairs as the appointing and dismissing authority. Consequently, the President of the PPO operates de facto as an informational-analytical body, deprived of the characteristics of a market regulator in the classical sense of public economic law. Such an institutional model appears inadequate in a reality where public procurement ­exerts a strategic impact on the functioning and development of the state, as well as on the implementation of its core economic policies.
The debate concerning the institutional status and powers of the President of the PPO ultimately raises the question whether the provisions of the Public Procurement Law require wholesale change, or whether the difficulty lies rather in inadequate institutional conditions hindering the full execution of tasks already envisaged by statute. A doctrinal analysis, juxtaposed with empirical data, indicates that the statutory catalogue of powers is broad, but lacks enforcement instruments that would make the authority’s influence effective. The legislator has granted the President of the PPO significant discretion in shaping the execution of analytical and supervisory duties, along with the ability to employ soft coordination instruments such as recommendations or model procurement documentation. Within the doctrine of administrative law and public economic law, it is emphasised that soft law instruments, when properly applied, may effectively supplement, and at times even substitute, coercive measures, particularly in fields demanding flexibility.
Nevertheless, the lack of tenure and of statutory grounds for dismissal weakens the institutional position of the President of the PPO, rendering the office susceptible to ongoing political influences. In comparison with other regulatory authorities, such as the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection or the President of the Energy Regulatory Office, the absence of this mechanism constitutes a significant lacuna undermining institutional independence. Moreover, the limited scope of coercive powers, confined to issuing recommendations devoid of enforcement sanctions, renders the supervisory function of the President of the PPO purely informational. De lege ferenda, it therefore seems justified to consider granting the office limited, yet genuine, decision-making abilities.
Comparative perspectives make it possible to identify two potential paths for redefining this authority. The French model, developed within the practice of the Direction des achats de l’État, emphasises the coordinating and planning function and the linkage of central authority recommendations with the allocation of budgetary resources. The German model, drawn up within the functioning of the Bundesbeschaffungsamt, by contrast, stresses the integration of executive and supervisory functions and their connection with the external audit system conducted by the Bundesrechnungshof. This German toolkit thus combines procedural flexibility in procurement with a high degree of institutional accountability.
A juxtaposition of these two models demonstrates that the effectiveness of a central public procurement authority does not depend exclusively on its formal institutional status, but rather, to a greater extent, on the availability of genuine instruments of influence, in particular the linkage of recommendations with budgetary and audit mechanisms. Accordingly, the postulate of reforming the institution of the President of the PPO should proceed in the direction of systemic reconstruction, within which the body would be transformed into an authority bearing the attributes of a quasi-market regulator. The introduction of fixed-term tenure, limited coercive powers, the embedding of recommendations within the system of public procurement financing, and mandatory participation in the legislative process would enable the closure of the existing institutional gap.
As a result, the President of the PPO could evolve from a passive-analytical body into an institution exercising genuine influence over the market, thereby ensuring the fuller realisation of the constitutional values of equality of entities before the law, transparency of administrative action, and rationality in the expenditure of public funds.