Monitor Prawa Handlowego

no. 3/2018

Margin squeeze as a competition restricting practice in the telecommunications services market

DOI: 10.32027/MPH.18.3.1
Rafał Adamus
Autor jest pracownikiem w Zakładzie Prawa Gospodarczego, Handlowego i Upadłościowego na WPiA Uniwersytetu Opolskiego.
Abstract

The article discusses the issue of an impermissible discriminative practice called margin squeeze (also known as price squeezing).The practice consists in that the vertically integrated dominant operator imposes an excessive price for the service of wholesale access to their own network thus preventing other operators to set a competitive retail offer.Therefore, the dominant does not discriminate directly their competitors but rather their customers.This problem has been illustrated with examples of practical solutions adopted bu competition protection authorities.