Monitor Prawa Handlowego
no. 3/2013
Restriction of the freedom to develop a corporate governance model of a joint stock company by the statutory strictness principle in the light of economic analysis of law
Autorka jest doktorem prawa, adwokatem w kancelarii Jankowski, Stroiński i Partnerzy JSLegal Adwokacka Spółka Partnerska.
Autorka jest absolwentką prawa w ramach Kolegium Międzywydziałowych Indywidualnych Studiów Humanistycznych na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, współpracownikiem kancelarii Jankowski, Stroiński i Partnerzy JSLegal Adwokacka Spółka Partnerska.
Abstract
The aim of this article is to examine whether the statutory strictness principle (expressed in Art. 304 § 3 and § 4 of the Commercial Companies Code), and the justification adopted in the Polish legal doctrine for maintaining it in the corporate governance area would withstand the analysis based on the criterion of economic effectiveness. Two major conclusions are drawn from the analysis combining elements of law and economics and comparative law analysis: (i) the examination of agency costs in companies with a dual corporate governance model reveals that in most cases individual peremptory provisions protecting stakeholders fulfil the postulate of economic effectiveness; (ii) however, as a whole the principle leads to unnecessary rigidity of the model of a joint stock company, especially with respect to the provisions described as technical. Therefore, with a view to progressing convergence of corporate governance models it should be postulated to restrict the application of this principle in the Polish legal system.
